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Death Mirrors the Spirit of Life 





The aim of this paper is to further an understanding of how a soul comes to despair and how the 
spirit of life is wounded. This question is approached from the perspective of death – in the form of 
death defying acts and voluntary death – as the dialectic aspect of  being and non-being. Death 
can be a reflection of the life lived and the experience of who I am. The relation between ego and 
Self determines who I am.  Two forms of misrelating between ego and Self will be considered. One 
causes a sense of omnipotence as the ego identifies with Self, and the other causes a sense of 
alienation as the ego renounces the Self to establish an intellectual vacuum, which becomes a 
substitute for lived experience. In both instances, there is a growing despair of inauthenticiy and 
the experience of non-being, which voluntary death and death defying acts attempt to put an end 
to. Both manifestations of death are attempts to resolve the imbalance between the eternal and 
temporal dimensions of being – to put an end to the despair of being unconscious of Self – and to 
affirm being. It is only when there is a conscious dialectic between ego and Self that an authentic 
existence becomes possible. An authentic existence represents the ongoing commitment to 
incarnate the human reality that exists between the world of imagination and the world as it 





For more than a decade now, New Zealand 
psychology has been challenged to develop the skills 
needed to attend to the needs of a religiously, racially 
and culturally diversifying society (Abbott & Durie, 
1987; Durie & Hermansson, 1990; NZPS, Sept. 
2001). It may be in this context that the then 
Associate Minister of Maori Affairs at the New 
Zealand Psychological Society’s Conference in 2000 
challenged the behavioural and experimental 
psychologists of mainstream psychology in New 
Zealand. She asked the question; ‘Do you seriously 
believe that you, with the training that you get are 
able to nurture the Maori psyche?; Are you able to see 
into the soul of the people and tend to the wounded 
spirit?’(Turia, 2000, August). The minister linked the 
despair, self-hatred and suicide among Maori people 
with the psychological consequences of colonisation, 
alienation and loss of identity (Turia, 2002, March). 
She concluded her address to the conference with the 
rhetorical question: “What is the difference between 
you saying ‘I think, therefore I am’ and us (Maori) 
saying ‘we are’?”  
 
In this paper, I propose to address the question about 
soul and a wounded spirit, and its relationship with 
the notion of I-am from a Jungian and existential-
phenomenological perspective. In Binswanger’s 
(1958) view the way in which a person dies reveals 
how he has lived, and it is from this perspective that I 
intend to approach the matter; to understand how a 
soul comes to live in despair and how the spirit of life 
is wounded.  How can suicide and death defying acts, 
for example, reveal the spirit in which life is lived? I 
suggest it does so as the dialectic aspect of being and 
non-being. It is in death that the experience of I-am is 
revealed. 
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When death becomes a disincarnated event, an 
impersonal absolute – as it does in the taunting and 
demeaning act of defying death, or when death 
becomes a voluntary act of affirmation of character – 
it points to a life-existence of despair. This despair is 
different from the despair when death as an idea is a 
conscious companion, experienced and confronted in 
the process of everyday life. Whilst the latter may be 
more precisely seen as suffering, the former is the 
kind of despair Kierkegaard (1983) refers to as 
‘sickness unto death’. Despair, he says, is a sickness 
of the spirit, a sickness of the self.  In a life-existence 
where death has become a disincarnated event, the 
unacknowledged spirit of man despairs. That matters 
of human life and death are appreciated only through 
the eyes of the natural-biological world is a sickness 
of the spirit, of the self. On the other hand, where 
death is a personal experience, the despair is 
qualitatively different in my view. In this experience, 
there is an acknowledgement of the spirit and a 
realisation that matters of human life and death 
transcend the temporal being. This is the despair 
qualified as suffering, the perpetual human project of 
synthesizing the temporal and eternal in matters of 
life and death. 
 
Physical sickness is not sickness unto death, says 
Kierkegaard (1983), because although death is the 
end of sickness, death is not the end. However, 
despair is a sickness unto death in which the end is 
death and death is the end. He continues to say that 
the despair and torment of this sickness is precisely 
the inability to die: “When death is the greatest 
danger we hope for life; but when we learn to know 
the even greater danger, we hope for death. When the 
danger is so great that death becomes the hope, then 
despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to 
die” (p. 18). This is to be understood as the perpetual 
agony of an existence of non-being.  It is an existence 
where the horizon of opportunity to exist as a whole 
person – to synthesize the temporal and eternal 
aspects of being – has fallen away. This is a lingering 
death, “this sickness of the self, actually to be dying, 
to die and yet not to die, to die death” (p. 18). It 
reflects a life-existence without imagination, a hollow 
and meaningless disincarnated event where there is a 
distinct boundary between the subjective experience 
of the world and the world encountered objectively. 
When one’s life-existence and the world has become 
“a spectacle for the disincarnate, despotic eye of the 
spectator” (Brooke, 2000, p. 18) it leads to the despair 
and ‘hopelessness of not even being able to die’ as 
one is trapped as an object with all other objects in 
the mundane world of appearance. 
 
Voluntary death and death defying acts are dialectic 
aspects of the temporal and the eternal, ego and Self. 
Voluntary death is the voice of ego-Self alienation 
and death defying acts of ego-Self identification. Both 
manifestations of death are attempts to resolve this 
imbalance between the eternal and temporal 
dimensions of being – to put an end to the despair of 
being unconscious of Self. 
 
The dialogue between life and death is a metaphor for 
the task of establishing an authentic existence, to be 
an undivided being. I will employ the ego-Self axis 
concept used by Edinger (1992) to explore voluntary 
death and death defying acts. Part 1 will attempt to 
bring a theoretical understanding to these phenomena 
from a Jungian and an existential-phenomenological 
perspective. Part 2 will attempt to articulate a life-
existence – the theoretical ideal – in which biological 
and ontological existence mature in concert and die 
together at the fulfilment of the human project of 
synthesis. 
 
The question of whether any discipline of thought 
about human existence that relies on the empirical 
scientific principles of permanence, absolutes and 
dualism (in other words, technical reason rather than 
ecstatic reason) can tend to a wounded spirit is, I 
believe, answered by inference. And whilst the aim of 
this paper is not to directly compare individual 
sickness and cultural complexes of anxiety, it cannot 
be ignored that the psychological conflict of 




Voluntary death and death defying acts 
 
In the recent past, New Zealand has had one of the 
highest youth suicide rates among the OECD 
countries (Drummond, 1997; Ministry of Health, 
2001). It is a phenomenon of great concern to the 
country and has attracted considerable government 
funding towards research and awareness programmes 
to date. New Zealand is also a country which 
promotes itself as an extreme sport tourist destination 
in the form of ‘bungy jumping’ and white-water 
kayaking, to name but two activities that are pursued 
in their utmost form. These activities per se are not 
unique to New Zealand, but what is unique is the 
apparent need to have these extreme activities 
associated with its national persona.  It is in 
Queenstown, New Zealand – the extreme sports 
capital of the world – where the fearless go to frighten 
themselves, say Mahne (2004).  Moreover, in this 
oxymoron a metaphysical truth is revealed. These acts 
reflect the compulsion to triumph over something, to 
elevate oneself high and above the ordinary. 
However, anyone “whose goal is ‘something higher’ 
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must expect some day to suffer vertigo”, say Kundera 
(1995, p. 56). Vertigo is not the fear of falling but 
rather the ‘voice of emptiness below us’ which 
beckons us and against which we fearfully defend 
ourselves.  I submit that fearlessness is an unbearable 
status of being the individual attempts to dissolve. It 
is a veiled longing to put an end to an apparent and 
alienating existence. In the attempt to put an end to 
this existence, voluntary death and death defying acts 
converge at a psychological level to affirm being.  As 
Kundera (1995) notes, extremes mean borders beyond 
which life ends, a veiled longing for death. In the 
longing for death is a hope for life. 
 
The ‘as if’ existence which death defying acts are 
attempting to put an end to, I submit, is the life-
existence of inflation, or, what Edinger (1992) refers 
to as ego-Self identification. Suicide, on the other 
hand, attempts to put an end to a life-existence of 
alienation, which is a disruption of the ego-Self axis 
in Edinger’s view.  Death defying acts and suicide, 
apparently different, are united in their purpose to 
establish a more authentic existence. To live 
authentically seems to have become increasingly 
problematic in our so-called modern era where the 
apparent world has become the real world and the 
‘real world’ the apparent world because of the notion 
of dualism, permanence and absolutes. As Engler 
(1998) points out, we have come to “misperceive 
what is impermanent as permanent, what is incapable 
of affording lasting satisfaction as satisfying, and 
what is without enduring substance or selfhood as 





Inflation and death defying acts 
 
The spirit of challenge and omnipotence characterizes 
death-defying acts. Death is mocked and thwarted in 
its purpose and there is a seeming carelessness and 
irreverence towards an existential given which, 
through its positive value, defines and gives meaning 
to human existence. By rendering death impotent in 
this irresponsible manner, the fragility of being is 
forgotten (Yalom, 1980). In this forgetfulness, 
consciousness and the meaning of self-responsibility 
is distorted. The individual being is ‘levelled down’ 
and we all become equal in the name of God 
(Nietzsche, 1990a), and under this illusion we 
become irresponsible, mind-less and care-less as-if 
we are inviolable and immortal. This is the paradox; 
although the death-defying artist continues to live in 
the mundane world, he has ceased to be ontologically, 
whereas in suicide – to be discussed later – the 
individual ceases to live in the apparent world but 





The original state of existence is the irreflective 
condition of ego-Self unity in which the ego is 
inflated by its identification with the Self as deity, 
says Edinger (1992). This is the solipsistic world of 
‘myself alone’, says Edinger. The maxim in this 
world is ‘I am, and all that is, am I’.  In this 
undifferentiated world, there is a twofold problem, 
according to Edinger. The challenge is to unite the 
gods and nature without total identification, to 
maintain ego-Self integrity whilst dissolving ego’s 
identification. This is the existential pivot of 
psychological development throughout life, the 
tension between life forces (ego) and those associated 
with death (Self), “such is the opus to which mortals 
must submit” (Welman, 2000, p. 134). With each step 
towards separation of ego-Self identity, the spirit of 
consciousness is wounded.  It is the wound of 
inflation.  It is a complex wound, which consists of 
the loss of a passive, irresponsible existence and the 
realization of one’s responsibility and mortality. 
 
With repeated cycles of unity and separation comes a 
progressive differentiation between the ego and Self. 
Individuation as an ideal state of being is a conscious 
dialectic between ego and Self.  Nothing remains to 
be made conscious and the individual stands at the 
beginning of history – an enlightened and unhistorical 
being – a modern man in the true sense of the word, 
according to Jung (1970). He stands at the very edge 
of the world, “he stands before the Nothing out of 
which All may grow” (p. 75). I shall pursue this idea 
in part two. 
 
However, the so-called modern man – in defying 
death – is a man living the past (i.e., the collective 
unconscious) and history possesses him through the 
archetypal structure of the Self.  Inflation is the 
‘provisional life’ characterised by entitlement and 
innocence of responsibility towards the circumstantial 
facts of reality (Edinger, 1992).  Marie-Louis von 
Franz (in Edinger) describes this as a fear to commit, 
to be bound, to be held accountable, of entering space 
and time and “being that one human being that one 
is” (p. 14). This inflation is the lightness of being that 
is so unbearable; it lacks presence and future, 
captured in the historical world and a past that 
overwhelms the constitutionally vulnerable and 
undifferentiated ego. 
 
Consciousness as relationship does not exist in this 
psychic orientation because there is no differentiation 
between subject and object (i.e., participation 
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mystique).  To experience oneself as being-in-the-
world requires a conscious recognition of one’s 
physical existence and mortality. In this regard, it is 
an interrelationship between three modes of 
existence; the ‘own world’ (Eigenwelt), the world 
‘with others’ (Mitwelt) and the ‘world around’ 
(Umwelt).  The “reality of  being-in-the-world is lost 
if one of these modes is emphasized to the exclusion 
of the other two” (May, 1958a, p. 63).  In particular, 
the interrelationships of these three modes depend 
upon self-awareness, the ‘self knowing itself’.  
Without this capacity to reflect, death has no positive 
or personal value, it is an ‘event’ in the static world of 
nature. The birth of consciousness is the birth of 
duality and separateness, says Edinger (1992).  He 
asserts that it is an innate stage of psychic 
development, which requires the polarisation of 
opposites; between spirit and nature, consciousness 
and unconsciousness.  Edinger reminds us that before 
the fall of man he was immortal but unconscious – the 
remaining tree in paradise offers both immortality and 
consciousness. In other words, the sufficiently 
differentiated ego sacrifices itself, concedes its 
position of centrality and notion of permanence (i.e., 
independent conscious ‘I’) to become a conscious 
relation of Self and participate in the eternal life.  
Now, the real world and the apparent world resume 
their original station in human existence with the 
realisation that there is only one world of being in the 
conscious attempt to incarnate the Self.  
 
When consciousness refuses to be tempered by 
reality, i.e., when it becomes distorted by the notion 
of absolutism and permanence, it becomes arrogant, 
excessive and without boundaries. It behaves in an 
omnipotent, irreflective and godlike manner – like a 
Titan – according to Lopez-Pedraza (1990). Death 
defying acts reflect the illusion that one’s death can 
be chosen, it seems “like a Titanic, Romantic 
inflation, coupled with the avoidance of the constant 
reflection which death plays alongside life – the value 
of life that comes from the reflection of death” (p. 
21).  To approach death and appreciate it as a 
negative value belonging to the biological world only, 
only as an objective fact, veils its metaphysical truth 
and purpose as a subjective reality from which 
consciousness of Self is born. Whilst consciousness 
of Self affirms one’s existence as a finite responsible 
human being, it also deepens the experience for the 
spiritual being that exists.  In acts of excess there is 
no consciousness of Self – one is Self – and in acts of 
suicidal despair, one is no Self (being no Self is an 
existential dilemma to which I shall attend later).   
 
I consider Kierkegaard’s (1983) formulation of 
‘despair to will to be oneself’ as relevant to ego-Self 
identification.  According to Kierkegaard, the despair 
to will to be oneself can be traced back to the despair 
to not will to be oneself (which will be addressed 
later).  He asserts that the “self that he despairingly 
wants to be is a self that he is not … in spite of all his 
despairing efforts, that power is the stronger and 
forces him to be the self he does not want to be” (p. 
20). In other words, when the ego is consumed by 
Self (spirit only), the Self as potential life remains 
unconscious and waits to be born, to be incarnated as 
Dasein – in that there, that is mine. I am of the view 
that it is the archetypal Self that is “the root of 
despair, whose worm does not die and whose fire is 
not quenched” (p. 18). It, I submit, continues to burn 
through images and the imagination – in dreams and 
fantasy – the spirit forever hopeful of life on earth, 
hoping for the courage of consciousness to make 
actual what is possible. It is only through the 
differentiated ego of our temporal being that the 
eternal being can be revealed. 
 
According to Welman (2000) death is a destructive 
threat from the conserving and uroboric Mother and 
also offers a release from the challenges of life to 
establish a sense of I-am. Consciousness is therefore 
continually threatened by both the chthonic and 
conserving component of Self, and the regressive 
nostalgia for the ‘lost Mother’, says Welman. Thus, in 
the shadow of an inflated life-existence lies the 
attraction of death as a “sanctuary from the demands 
of conscious existence” (p. 130).  In our so-called 
modern world that is dominated by egocentric 
consciousness, the dynamic link between ego and Self 
is disrupted through inflation and alienation. The 
death instinct then becomes a call from Self to revive 
the world of imagination and to re-establish this 
dynamic link of balance between the temporal and 
eternal worlds of being., It is, says Welman, “a 
calling of Being and to Being” (p. 135). It is only 
through the conscious integration of Self and its 
archetypal structure that the individual can find the 
meaning of his existence against the backdrop of the 
eternal Being. 
 
A narrow escape with death – where the fearless go to 
frighten themselves – is an awakening experience. It 
awakens one from one’s ignorance of being in despair 
and a new orientation or weltanschauung emerges, 
according to Edinger (1992).  A remnant of ego-Self 
identity is dissolved and the complementary values of 
the mundane and mysterious worlds are restored. The 
insufficiently separated ego that devalues the 
biological world to the dictates of the imaginal world 
– regardless of the limitations and constraints of 
circumstantial facts – comes of age.  Consciousness is 
broadened by the realisation that one cannot rid 
oneself of the self that one is; to be the self of one’s 
dreams is a mere illusion (Kierkegaard, 1983). Thus, 
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a broadened consciousness, where ego and Self form 
a relationship in which both are affected, inaugurates 
the existence of being human on the other side of 
despair. 
 
Pain, suffering and death do exist prior to the birth of 
consciousness, but because there is no consciousness 
to experience them, they do not exist psychologically 
(Edinger, 1992). Ego-Self identification equates to the 
death of consciousness of being – an ontological 
death – and the potential death at the end of a defying 
act is meaningless and of no positive value.  The 
emancipating ego – when still narrow, vulnerable and 
irreflective – answers to the nostalgic call of the 
primordial Mother with the same mind-less and care-
less-ness with which it pursues death-defying acts. 
Death defying acts thus reflect a life-existence in 
which the progression towards separation and 
differentiation is still in its infancy.  The life spirit is 
wounded by blindness and inflation. “Remember that 
the Titan, Prometheus, did not want to reflect from 
death; he wanted to liberate man from thinking about 
death” (Lopez-Pedraza, 1990, p. 26).  Death defying 
acts reflect a life-existence in the Titanic image of the 
spirit of consciousness. By sleeping with eyes open, 




Voluntary death and alienation 
 
Thus far, I have considered the relationship between 
death defying acts and ego-Self identification as 
phenomena that mark the inflated stage of 
development in the continuous cycle of psychic 
maturation.  In the following section, I propose to 
consider the relationship between voluntary death and 
alienation as phenomena of a significant disruption 
along the ego-Self axis. Part 2 will aim to provide an 
overview of the ideal stage of psychic development, 





According to Edinger (1992), the expectations of the 
inflated ego are frustrated by reality and this 
experience results in an estrangement of ego and Self. 
Unchecked, this estrangement evolves into a sense of 
alienation from the basic ground of Self which 
represents the fullest possible consciousness, says 
Hart (1997). The Self announces itself through 
dreams, images, feelings and intuition and is a symbol 
for the original matrix of existence where there is no 
division of opposites.  However, the Self is not a 
substance in and for itself, but a status of being which 
incarnates through relatedness. Suzuki (1998, p. 28) 
describes this status of being (where there is a living 
dialectic between the ego and Self) as one of thought-
less-ness where the borders of a discriminating and 
differentiating consciousness are “overstepped and 
one is plunged into the Unconscious which is not, 
after all, unconscious … this is seeing into one’s Self-
nature”. 
 
Subject-object dualism has provided the Occidental 
with a point of reference to give form to his 
experience and the world of things, says Kelman 
(1998). This dichotomy represents, psychologically 
speaking, the emancipation of the ego from the 
‘psychic dominants’ as a heroic act necessary upon 
the long journey of self-discovery (Jung, 1969).  
Jung, however, continues and says that this 
emancipation does not represent anything final and 
that it is ‘more or less illusory freedom’.  It is merely 
a slice through the never-ending cycle of 
differentiation and synthesis of our evolving and 
broadening consciousness – ‘it is merely the creation 
of a subject, who, in order to find fulfilment, has to be 
confronted by an object’. The object being referred to 
here is the objective psyché or the collective 
unconscious, and not the object perceived by the five 
senses. 
 
To avoid a confrontation with Self results in a one-
sided consciousness in which one is cast into the 
world of objects to become an object oneself. In this 
state, which Samuels, Shorter and Plaut (1986) 
describe as “neurosis”, one can no longer take one’s 
aliveness, relatedness and identity for granted. In this 
existential dilemma of ontological insecurity (Laing, 
1965; Rycroft, 1972) one is, paradoxically, at the 
mercy of the rejected Self, beset by what Neumann 
(1954) refers to as ‘paroxysms of will and action’ 
(i.e., possession). 
 
This existential dilemma of meaninglessness and 
despair is brought into focus by Kierkegaard’s (1983) 
notion of ‘despair to will to be rid of oneself’.  I 
associate this notion with ego-Self alienation. The 
despair is precisely that it is not possible to be rid of 
the eternal Self, for if “there was nothing eternal in a 
man, he would not despair at all; if despair could 
consume his self, then there would be no despair at 
all” (p. 21).  In alienation, the will to be the other (to 
be your projection) is to deny the one you are. When 
you become like the other (if that is at all possible) 
you are still faced with the one you essentially are. 
This is the same reality faced when one fails to be 
like the other: the despair to will to be rid of oneself. 
“Consequently, to despair over something (to be 
something other) is still not despair proper.  It is the 
beginning, or, as the physician says of an illness, it 
has not yet declared itself” (p. 19). The declaration 
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comes, I believe, when the realization dawns that one 
does not have a Self, but that the Self has one and that 
despair is essentially with oneself. 
 
From a non-dualistic perspective of  human reality 
and consciousness, Welman (2000) writes that death 
does not only refer to a regressive condition, but also 
to a progressive and evolved state where ego-
consciousness gives way to a more encompassing 
consciousness. Death is now reconstituted as a fuller 
life, born from the conjunction of opposites held apart 
by an egocentric consciousness. This establishes a 
vital connection between Self, death and the imaginal 
life of Being, according to Welman. This is an 
“illimitable space or ‘nothingness’ within which 
images can emerge in their own right” (p. 131).  The 
sacrificial death of ego-consciousness’ proclivity to 
differentiate and keep apart is a return to the home 
ground and resurrection of the human imagination, 
but the renunciation of the qualities of the heroic ego 
is no easy matter, it “daunts even the gods” (Jung 
quoted in Welman, p. 133). That which daunts even 
the gods is the human project of becoming an 
indivisible being. The capacity to synthesize the 
eternal and the temporal is something over which 
humanity cannot but despair. It is this despair which 
Kierkegaard considers both ‘excellence and defect’ – 
because man as spirit is not able to die – it raises him 
above the animal, it indicates his “infinite erectness 
and sublimity, that he is spirit (italics mine)” (p. 15). 
This eternal dimension of being is what nails man to 
himself, asserts Kierkegaard. He cannot rid himself of 
his self. This is eternity’s greatest and infinite 
acknowledgement of mortal man’s innate capacity to 
give life to the gods and “it is also eternity’s claim 
upon him” (p. 21). 
 
The Self is first experienced as projection and if these 
projections are accepted, no matter how antithetical, 
the basic validity of wholeness of being is affirmed 
(Edinger, 1992; Jung, 1983).  Through this self- 
acceptance, the individual finds the courage to face 
his finitude and mortality as he attempts to integrate 
these insights into conscious acknowledgement. 
Progressively, an optimal balance is struck between 
the extremes of god-likeness and animal likeness. 
However, when there is intolerance, non-acceptance 
of these projections of Self, the link between the ego 
and Self is severed, and this results in a consciousness 
that becomes an end in and for itself. This is an 
epistemological loneliness (May, 1958a) and it is in 
this vacuum of consciousness-only, that ontological 
statements are distorted.  Anxiety is then seen to be 
caused by faulty thinking and is not seen as a voice 
which comments on the experience of non-being. 
 
This broken connection between ego and Self leads to 
emptiness, meaninglessness and despair, causing 
psychoses and suicide, say Edinger (1992). “We do 
not lack for modern expressions of the alienated state.  
In fact, they are so ubiquitous, our time could well be 
called the age of alienation” (p. 47).  
 
In the alienated state, where the voice of Self is no 
longer heard, the archetypal forces of the Self, 
paradoxically, unconsciously possess humankind. 
Humankind feels alive in the apparent world, but he is 
existentially dead, he is a corpse among people, 
according to Binswanger (1958).  Old age is when the 
lived past overpowers the life which is yet to be lived, 
but it is also possible to be biologically young, yet 
existentially old, the Dasein has been fulfilled, 
according to Binswanger. This is the instance of 
alienation where the present and future cannot unfold 
under the overbearing weight of ‘the history of man’. 
Death then becomes a necessary event to fulfil the life 
meaning of this existence, to be born the being one 
essentially is. 
 
An “ego that kills itself is more active, more 
independent and individual, than the sad resignation 
of the languishing lover” (Neumann, 1954, p. 97).  
Voluntary death as a life-transcending death comes to 
represent a glad release from a Dasein, which has 
been fulfilled.  It is the release from an existence 
without presence or future. From an existential 
perspective “suicide itself must be understood in this 
light”, says Binswanger (1958, p. 296).  It is the last 
practical act of this existence which stems from the 
embodied world of action, deliberation and planning.  
It is not an act from a world in potentia – the ‘as if’ 
existence – but rather an affirmation, or birth of a 
deciding and acting individual being. Voluntary death 
represents that commitment to become the being that 
one is, to enter space and time and to incarnate the 
potential life. It is the ‘parting for ever’ from a 
nihilistic weltanschauung, states Binswanger.  It is a 
parting from a world where the conscious connection 
with the original ground no longer exists. Voluntary 
death then becomes an affirmation of being-one-self. 
It mirrors a life that foundered on the existence of not 
being-one-self and through suicide; one’s authentic 
presence is claimed. It announces “authentically I am 
myself, or I exist authentically when I decisively 
resolve the situation in acting, in other words, where 
present and having-been unite in an authentic 
present” (Binswanger, 1958, p. 298). 
 
In voluntary death – as a reflection of the life lived in 
despair and alienation – the person finds himself and 
chooses himself.  Death becomes a birth and the 
individual stands at the edge of the world facing the 
‘Nothing from which All may grow’. 
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Part II 
 
Human existence on the other side of despair 
 
The crisis of the imagining, embodied being revolves 
around the tension and dialogue between spirit and 
matter. It is between the extremes of Kundera’s 
(1984) ‘something higher’ and the ‘voice of 
emptiness below’, the spiritual-only and the spiritual-
less, where soul and the concept of Dasein converge. 
It is in the empty space between these extremes where 
that ‘there that is mine’ incarnates and consciousness 
is broadened.  It is by being natural that one best 
recovers from one’s unnaturalness, from one’s 
spirituality, says Nietzsche (1990b).  Dasein and soul 
both represent a third position between the sublime 
and the mundane as the authentic world of humanity. 
 
 
Dasein and soul 
 
Dasein – sein (being) and da (there) – is a reality of 
experience of which there can only be one.  It is a 
world created through relatedness, an “unrepeatable 
cohesion with a specific individual”, unique and 
original which dies when the individual dies (Kruger, 
1979, p. 29). This reality, understood as Dasein, is 
circumscribed by the interrelationship of the three 
modes of existence: Umwelt, Mitwelt and Eigenwelt, 
mentioned previously. From this ontological premise, 
it is understood that man shows himself only through 
himself, it is a being that carries (italics mine) his 
whole existence, says Kruger (1979).  To carry one’s 
whole existence, points towards the decisive act of 
accepting the responsibility of giving meaning to 
one’s own existence as a synthesis of the temporal 
and eternal. 
 
Dasein, as the human face of existence, casts a certain 
light upon our idea about consciousness, 
responsibility, truth, knowledge and death.  I am of 
the view that it also echoes the need for the 
restoration of the traditional tripartite arrangement of 
mind, psyche and spirit which has been dichotomized 
into mind and spirit by the Cartesian mindset of the 
Westerner, according to Hillman (1987).  
 
Hillman (1992) describes soul as having more depth 
in ordinary life and being alive and present in most 
ordinary things.  A soulful attitude always leads into 
the depths, beyond the observing ‘I’ which escapes 
the attention of empiricism.  We live forgetfully, says 
Romanyshyn (1982) and psychology is challenged to 
work with that which was there before man was born, 
the imagination. The soul is imagination, says 
Hillman, and in his paper Peaks and Vales (1987) he 
argues that soul is neither spirit nor matter and that a 
psychology of depth, of the soul, has to base itself “in 
a third place between esse anima, ‘ being in soul’” (p. 
2). Moore (1992) associates the Buddhist concept of 
emptiness with soul: it is to experience things, as they 
are, as they present themselves at that moment, 
without altering the experience with ‘known facts’.  
In other words, it is a way of living which avoids so-
called intellectual truth (technical reason) to cloud 
experiential truth (ecstatic reason). “First ‘soul’ refers 
to the deepening of events into experiences; second, 
the significance soul makes possible, whether in love 
or in religious concern, derives from its special 
relationship with death” (Hillman, 1992, p. xvi).  
Soul emerges precisely as result of the opus of man to 
create a meaningful existence between the forces of 
life (ego) and the forces associated with death (Self). 
 
Dasein implies a consciousness which does not exist 
in and for itself (Kruger, 1979). It always intends an 
object and is directed onto that which is not 
consciousness itself.  For example, argues Kruger, 
one does not just love, but one loves somebody. Thus, 
consciousness as intentional is always mixed with the 
subject of experience, of the one being conscious. 
Consciousness can consequently never be objective in 
the empirical scientific definition of the term – 
independent, absolute, verifiable – because it is a 
transient product unique to the quality of the 
relationship between object and subject.  It is in 
consciousness as relationedness that events in the 
apparent world become experiences of the real world, 
and in this dialectic, two worlds become one where 
matters of love, religion and death become significant 
for the being that is ‘there’. This is the deepening of 
ordinary life.  It is a life-existence which is present in 
the most ordinary things and amounts to the 
restoration of soul in which the world of appearance 
is always mixed with the human imagination. 
 
This creative embodiment of the dialogue between 
the mundane world and the imaginative world points 
towards the maxim of existentialism; that man is 
always becoming, potentially always in crisis 
between the forces of being and non-being (May, 
1958b).  It is this crisis that quickens the human 
capacity to be conscious of, and responsible for, his 
existence, “not only as ‘being-in-itself’, as all things 
are but also as ‘being-for-itself’” (May, 1958a, p. 41).  
In this I-am experience, the real-I-zation of one’s Self 
depends upon being aware and responsible for 
incarnating that ‘there that is mine’. This, I submit, 
characterises a living spirit with soul. Milan Kundera 
(1984) indirectly comments on this crisis of being, 
this existential burden. The burden to give our 
spiritual quest a human face can be an almost 
unbearable Cross.  Yet, the absolute absence of a 
burden results in the unbearable lightness of being as 
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its soars into the Apollonian heights to “become only 
half real, (one’s) movements as free as they are 
insignificant” (p. 5). 
 
May (1958a) reminds us that the verb ‘to know’ in 
ancient Greek and Hebrew is the same word for 
sexual intercourse. Thus, knowledge of another and 
‘the other’ begins as an act of intimacy, an 
experience-near encounter of numinosity in which 
opposites are joined.  Knowledge is thus the 
embodiment of experience and is created by paying 
attention to the dialectic between the inner and outer 
worlds with an imaginative eye. Knowledge 
approximates the facts of experience and stands in 
relation to experience as ego stands to Self.  It can 
thus not be permanent or absolute. This dialectic 
creates something unique and original. The essence of 
truth is the freedom to reveal that which is in 
principle already open, states Kruger (1979). That 
which is revealed is what Kruger refers to as ‘first 
person statements’ which are ‘in a sense 
indisputable’, he asserts. I consider images and the 
products of imagination as forms of ‘first person 
statements’ of truth. Those images contained in 
metaphor, symbol or symptom are means by which 
soul attempts to articulate and announce itself as 
‘being there’. This is the being that is there which 
announces itself when, hypothetically speaking, we 
already know everything through cold logic and 
reason. 
 
Being and non-being are inseparable. The one defines 
the other, a precondition by which the other exists.  
The crisis of being is a dialogue with the many forms 
of non-being; the existential given of one’s personal 
death, death by conformism, death through possession 
by the Self and death through the despairing 
alienation from the Self. However, by confronting 
non-being in its various guises, one’s “existence takes 
on vitality and immediacy, and the individual 
experiences a heightened consciousness of himself, 
his world, and others around him” (May, 1958a, p. 
48). 
 
With our modern and dominant egocentric 
consciousness, death becomes a literal and absolute 
event in the distant future, and that leads inescapably 
to the death of meaning, according to Welman (2000).  
It is also the death of responsibility to confront and 
acknowledge that despair which is non-being. A 
meaningful and authentic existence is when events 
are turned into experiences, allowing oneself to be 
drawn deeper into living here-and-now. This is a 
spirited life with soul in which the narrow confines of 
the literalizing and concretizing ego are renounced in 
search of meaning in imagination, symbol and 
expression. “If  theoretically, this entails a 
confrontation with the reality of Self, then 
existentially it involves an encounter with the 






What is the difference between ‘I think, therefore I 
am’ and ‘I am’? I have attempted in this discourse to 
reflect upon this by arguing that the spirit in which 
life is lived – and how the essence of being is 
experienced – is reflected in the attitude towards 
death. 
 
In a life-existence marked by the experience of I-am, 
there is a conscious dialogue between ego and Self.  
This dialogue represents life as a third position 
between spirit and matter, a synthesis of the eternal 
and temporal being that one is. This life-existence is a 
living spirit with soul, where the meaning of one’s 
existence is discovered in the most ordinary things 
and life created every moment in the here-and-now. It 
is a life conscious of the authentic suffering to 
incarnate ‘that world that is mine’, between the will to 
be Self and the will not to be Self.  It is then that one 
stands in that Empty space, before the ‘Nothing out of 
which All may grow’ – a modern man in the true 
sense of the word. 
 
In a life-existence dominated by the experience of ‘I 
think, therefore I am’, there is a misrelating between 
ego and Self, between the temporal and eternal 
dimensions of human existence. One form of 
misrelating is the ego’s identification with Self, which 
creates the experience of oneself as if one is 
inviolable and omnipotent. Life is lived in 
unconscious despair – even in death there is no hope 
for life – because one is ontologically already a long 
time dead (one is Self).  This life-existence of despair 
is articulated through death defying acts which have 
the same hallmarks of the life lived: irreverent, 
omnipotent and entitled.  The other form of 
misrelating between ego and Self is ego’s alienation 
from the latter, which creates the experience of 
oneself as if one is an independent and substantial 
existing Self (something other than the self one is). In 
this life-existence, one lives in the intellectual 
vacuum of alienation, whilst the imagination steadily 
atrophies and dies. This life-existence of despair is 
articulated by voluntary death which bears the same 
hallmarks of the life lived: I am not of this world, and 
am constantly gnawing at the emptiness and 
meaninglessness of it all. 
 
In a life-existence circumscribed by the constant 
misrelating of the ego and Self, death becomes the 
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constant calling of Being to restore this disjunction, to 
invite the undivided being one potentially is – this is 
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